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108

April 11, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: 3 - The Secretary

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: U-2 Flights, Cuba -- Contingency Plans.

Attached is a revised version of contingency plans on U-2 flights over Cuba which takes account of formal comments made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary McNamara will be discussing this draft with the JCS tomorrow morning.

Enclosure;

As stated.

Mr. Hall. ✓

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COVER MEMO DATED APRIL 11, 1963  
DECLASSIFIED BY: DER DIR I A REGION, OASD(IA)  
ON: 31 OCT 1989

OASD(PA) DFOISR  
88-FOI-1267  
88-TS-121  
Doc # (3) (R1)  
SPACE DOC 108

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1/11/73

U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE CONGO KINSHASA

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A.

B.

C.

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REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

PAGES 3 - 6 DELETED IN ENTIRETY

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

REVIEWED by JmClark DATE 1/17/90☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY in PART☐ DENY ☐ Non-responsive info

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MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Secretary

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning -- U-2 Flights, Cuba.

Attached is a draft of a paper on this subject worked out by Paul Nitze, a Joint Staff representative, and myself. Annexes to back up the intelligence aspects on page 1 are being prepared.

Work in particular still needs to be done on what, if any, substantive positions could be taken that would give Khrushchev a "way out".

Enclosure:

Draft, as stated.

Copy for G - Mr. Ball

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by RB Austin DATE \_\_\_\_\_☐ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY in PART☒ DENY ☐ Non-responsive info

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U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS

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I. FACTS BEARING ON PROBLEM:

- A. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.
- B. There is no presently available alternative to U-2 surveillance which would meet the presently approved coverage requirements.
- C. Before taking action that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly *desirable* and militarily prudent to bring our forces, particularly SAC, to a high degree of readiness as well as to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and reinforce that base. Such steps would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiated without almost immediate public knowledge.
- D. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be determined and evaluated within the time frame now considered probable, and weather permitting, it is militarily possible to mount an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the day in which a U-2 is destroyed.
- E. Political support argues for as much advance notice as possible to our principal allies, particularly those in Europe, that might be

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endangered by Soviet retaliation.

- F. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw and thus increase the dangers of escalation and/or confusion among our allies.

II. ADVANCE PUBLIC WARNING:

- A. With public advance warning and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action. Followed by:

1. Unsuccessful attack.

2. Successful attack: [REDACTED]

- B. Without advance public warning and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action:

1. Unsuccessful attack.

2. Successful attack: [REDACTED]

- C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba.

III. SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION:

- A. Public advance warning by Soviets and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action:

1. Stand down U-2 flights.

2. Initiate

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2. Initiate military preparations by declaration of appropriate DEFCON in all U. S. commands, evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of installations, etc.
3. Inform SAC.
4. Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle and Arafat.
5. Call Organ of Consultation, CAS, to obtain reaffirmation necessity of overflights.
6. Inform Secretary General of the United Nations and consider what additional United Nations action should be taken.
7. Transmit message from the President to Khrushchev.
8. Public statement by the President, including a message to the Cuban people.
9. Upon completion of military preparations within about 72 hours resume U-2 flights.
10. If there is a single unsuccessful attack on a U-2, promptly announce publicly, including fact U-2 flights will continue, but do not at this stage attack IAF sites.
11. If there is a second attack -- successful or unsuccessful -- promptly take out the IAF site identified as having carried out the attack.
12. If attacks are resumed, simultaneously take out remaining IAF sites.

2. No

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3. No prior public warning or indicators of imminent Soviet action:

1. Unsuccessful attack:

- a. Announce publicly fact of attack.
- b. Take all measures under III. A. above.

2. Successful attack.

- a. Initiate military preparations for attack on SAM site.
- b. Declare appropriate JMWGSs in all United States commands, and initiate evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
- c. Transmit Presidential message to Khrushchev for delivery at hour attack on SAM is to be launched. (Message should simultaneously be given to Soviet Ambassador in Washington.)
- d. Inform NSC immediately prior to attack.
- e. Transmit instructions to NSC to inform Secretary General of the United Nations at time attack is initiated and call for immediate Security Council meeting at same time.
- f. Call meeting of Organ of Consultation of the OAS as closely as possible to time attack scheduled.
- g. Transmit Presidential messages to Adenauer, De Gaulle, de Gaulle and Pompidou.
- h. Issue public statement by President at hour attack is launched.
- i. Carry out attack on identified SAM site.

C. Discharge

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C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba.

If Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response to United States attack against all sites, immediately convene tripartite group to consider implementation or appropriate modification of "Enforced Response" as a means of action with respect to Berlin.

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**TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW**

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MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Seretary

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning - U-2 Flights, Cuba

Attached is a draft of a paper on this subject worked out by Paul Nitze, a Joint Staff representative, and myself. Annexes to back up the intelligence aspects on page 1 are being prepared.

Work in particular still needs to be done on what, if any, substantive positions could be taken that would give Khrushchev a "way out."

I. FACTS BEARING ON PROBLEM:

- A. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.
- B. There is no presently available alternative to U-2 surveillance which would meet the presently approved coverage requirements.
- C. Before taking action that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly desirable and militarily prudent to bring our forces, particularly SAC, to a high degree of readiness as well as to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and reinforce that base. Fuel stops would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiated without almost immediate public knowledge.

D. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be determined

and evaluated within the time frame now considered probable, and weather permitting, it is militarily possible to mount an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the same day as U-2 is destroyed.

- E. Political support argues for as much advance notice as possible to our principal allies, particularly those in Europe that might be

endangered by Soviet retaliation.

F. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw and thus increase the dangers of escalation and/or confusion among our allies.

II. [ ILLEGIBLE ]:

A. With public advance warning and/or other indications of imminent Soviet

action. Followed by:

1. Unsuccessful attack.
2. Successful attack [excised]

B. Without advance public warning and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action:

1. Unsuccessful attack.
2. Successful attack

C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba.

III. SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION:

A. Public advance warning by Soviets and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet action.

1. Stand down U-2 flights

2. Initiate military preparations by declaration of appropriate DEFCON in all U.S. commands, evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo, etc.
3. Inform MAC.
4. Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Fanfani.
5. Call Organ of Consultation, OAS, to obtain affirmation necessity of overflights.
6. Inform Secretary General of the United Nations and consider what additional United States action should be taken.
7. Transmi message from the President to Khrushchev.
8. Public statement by the President, including a message to the Cuban people.
9. Upon completion of military preparations within about 72 hours resume U-2 flights.
10. If there is a single unsuccessful attack on a U-2, promptly announce publicly, including fact U-2 flights will continue, but do not at this stage attack SAM site.
11. If there is a second attack - successful or unsuccessful - promptly take out the SAM site identified as having carried out the attack.
12. If attacks are resumed, simultaneously take out remaining SAM sites.

B. No prior public warning or indication of imminent Soviet action:

1. Unsuccessful attack:

- a. Announce publicly fact of attack.
- b. Take all measures under III.A. above.

2. Successful attack:

- a. Initiate military precautions for attack on SAM site.
- b. Declare appropriate DEFCON in all United States commands, and initiate evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
- c. Transit Presidential message to Khrushchev for delivery at hour attack on SAM is to be launched. (Message should simultaneously be given to Soviet Ambassador in Washington.)
- d. Inform MAC immediately prior to attack.
- e. Transmit instructions with USUN to inform Secretary General of the United Nations at time attack is initiated and call for immediate Security Council meeting at same time.
- f. Call meeting of Organ of Consultation of the OAS as closely as possible to time attack scheduled.
- g. Transmit Presidential message to Adenauer, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Fanfani.
- h. Issue public statement by President at hour attack is launched.
- i. Carry out attack on identified SAM site.



C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba:

If Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response to United States attack against SAM sites, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation of appropriate modification of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with regard to Berlin.